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Imre Ruzsa—A Man of Consequence
Abstract. The singular aim and task of this paper is to present an overview of 
the life and work of Imre Ruzsa.
1 AN UNUSUAL ROUTE TO PHILOSOPHY
Ruzsa’s life was rather different from a typical academic career. He was born 
on the 12th of May in 1921 in Budapest but grew up in a little town in the south-
eastern part of Hungary as the son of a tailor. His family couldn’t send him to 
high school, so after finishing elementary school, he worked as an assistant to 
his father. At the age of seventeen, he left his father’s house and worked as a 
tailor’s assistant first in Debrecen, a city in Eastern Hungary, then in Budapest. 
He joined to the Social Democratic Party once in Budapest, and was admitted to 
the illegal Communist Party. He worked as the printer for the party newspaper 
and for this activity, he was convicted to eleven years in prison in 1942. The first 
time he heard about mathematics beyond the common arithmetical operations 
was from a Communist economist in the prison courtyard. Like other political 
prisoners, he was sent to the front lines in a forced labour company in 1944. He 
escaped and survived the rest of the war with false documents in Budapest.
After the war, he finished high school on an accelerated track, then in 1947, 
he began his university studies at the Faculty of the Humanities of Budapest 
University. He attended diverse lectures on philosophy and Hungarian linguis-
tics. After the reorganization of university programs in 1950, he became a stu-
dent of mathematics, physics and descriptive geometry at the new Faculty of 
Science. By taking a look at his university records, we can note the intellectual 
level of the Mathematical Institute of Budapest University in those years: in 
fact, to this day, all professors listed there are regarded as prominent figures of 
the history of modern mathematics. At the very least, let me mention the name 
of Lipót Fejér, Rózsa Péter and Alfréd Rényi. Ruzsa’s academic records indicate 
that he fulfilled the requirements of this institute with flying colors. In personal 
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conversations, he himself remarked that his mathematical studies allowed him 
to keep a bit more of a distance from politics at that point. But politics and his-
tory didn’t release him: in the year 1953, a few weeks before Stalin’s death, he 
was arrested again and sentenced to five years for “war crimes and crimes against 
the people”. He was set free in the next year and rehabilitated in 1957.
In 1956, he finished his unversity studies and began teaching mathematics in 
a geological polytechnic. In 1960, he was invited to the University as a lecturer 
of mathematical calculus. From 1962 on, he taught mathematics for philosophy 
students. In these years, he began his research into modal and deontic logic. Ear-
lier, while still a student, he had studied mathematical logic with Rózsa Péter,by 
this time, they were at the same department—Rózsa Péter read Ruzsa’s writings 
in the sixties and gave him extensive advice and comments, especially on the 
philosophy of mathematics and on the mathematical aspects of logic. Ruzsa was 
in contact with the other great master of mathematical logic in Hungary, László 
Kalmár, too, but in philosophical logic, Ruzsa had no ancestors and mentors in 
Hungary at all, nor did he have any opportunities to study abroad either. He 
simply used the library and began corresponding with Arthur N. Prior, whose 
ideas had the greatest influence on him.
2 EARLY WORK IN PHILOSOPHY
In the year 1965, the Philosophy Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sci-
ences offered Ruzsa a job as a research fellow. He accepted it but kept his posi-
tion at the university as a part-time assistant professor. During the sixties, he 
wrote several pieces about the philosophy of mathematics: a book for teachers 
(1967), an article in the Hungarian Philosophical Review, a series of articles for 
scientists and science teachers, remarkable lecture notes on mathematics for 
students of philosophy (1964), as well as a book for the broader public (1968). 
Ruzsa had many popular writings on mathematics and often connected the pop-
ularization of mathematics with philosophy. He was awarded the Manó Beke 
prize for popularizing mathematics in 1971.
A second group of his early papers consists of eight survey papers about con-
temporary research in philosophical logic for the Hungarian Philosophical Re-
view. It was not merely academic reasons that led him to write the last three of 
these about research on symbolic logic in the Soviet Union. Ruzsa needed to 
prove that modern logic in philosophy didn’t threaten the ideological founda-
tions of the Communist regime. He presented what was effectively an argument 
from authority, showing that symbolic logic was an accepted research area in 
the Soviet Union. Investigations by Soviet logicians at that time, like Vladimir 
Smirnov or Aleksandr Zinoviev, who was later to become a political dissident, 
and some others, were carried out in accordance with logical research at leading 
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Western universities. Within Hungarian philosophy, during the sixties, Ruzsa 
stood almost alone with his research program. It would be unjust to deny that 
there were some philosophers who tried to integrate some tools and ideas of 
modern logic into university education and research; but mostly these efforts led 
to no more than a confused mixture of modern and obsolete ideas. In the realm 
of education, it was Sándor Szalai who did the best work in terms of integrating 
some modern logic into the logic curriculum at Budapest University during the 
forties and fifties; but the effects of his work were limited because Szalai was 
not a logician, not even a philosopher, but a sociologist who knew a fair amount 
about logic. The situation was paradoxical because in mathematical logic, Hun-
gary had an abundance of great scholars, such as László Kalmár, Rózsa Péter and 
their numerous students. It was Ruzsa’s mission to convey their knowledge to 
philosophy.
The third group of papers includes the first results of his own research in logic. 
He focused on two topics: deontic logic and the connection between logic and 
probability theory. His doctoral thesis at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (the 
degree was called “candidate of mathematical science”) was based on the latter 
topic. The title was “Random models of logical systems”; it was prepared without 
an official supervisor and Ruzsa mentions in the documents no mentor or advisor 
in Hungary. Ruzsa didn’t subsequently return to this topic. Another branch of 
his early work was, however, the very beginning of a continuous line of research 
for the decades to come. Deontic systems are in fact special cases of modal logic; 
Ruzsa’s survey papers from the same time display his interest into general modal 
logic and Kripke semantics. The idea of semantic value gaps which turned out to 
be the central thought of his logical work emerged during this time from his study 
of Arthur Prior’s work and from correspondence with him.
3 AT THE DEPARTMENT OF LOGIC
In 1970, both the structure of the departments and the curriculum for philoso-
phy students was reorganised at Eötvös University in Budapest. Mathematics 
was banned from the curriculum, but Ruzsa received a new task: he joined in 
the teaching of logic. The newly founded Department of Logic was in charge 
of the course of study in logic, which consisted of two main components up 
until the transition period in 1989-90: two or three semesters of formal logic and 
two semesters of dialectical logic. The basic principle was that the true logic 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy was dialectical logic and formal logic was just a 
subordinated preliminary study to it. Dialectical logic meant, according to the 
head of department, a sort of materialistically transformed Hegelian logic; it in 
fact required no more formal logic than a minimal knowledge of Aristotelian 
syllogistic.
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However, this situation made it possible to teach some real logic to young 
philosophers as long as one resigned oneself to steering clear of questioning the 
superiority of dialectical logic. Ruzsa published the first version of his lecture 
notes in logic in 1969, even though he taught the lectures on logic only the next 
year, and accepted the invitation to the Department of Logic as an associated 
professor in 1971. This was a great turn both in Ruzsa’s life and in logic educa-
tion.
There was a threefold difference between earlier “formal” logicians at Bu-
dapest university and Ruzsa. Firstly, he had the requisite mathematical back-
ground to follow contemporary research and contribute to it. Secondly, he didn’t 
bother with improving and modernising old teaching materials and curricula but 
wrote a completely new one built on modern logic (and improved it over the 
next thirty years).1 Thirdly, he didn’t go into discussions about what real dia-
lectical logic was supposed to be. Other people in Hungary, as well as in other 
Eastern-block countries, tried to sell under the name “dialectical logic” some 
more or less modern methodology of science and were therefore drawn into 
conflicts with Hegelian dialectical logicians. Ruzsa didn’t interfere with the af-
fairs of dialectical logicians. Instead, he responded in sarcastical short articles 
when mathematical logic was attacked for sneaking antidialectic, metaphysical, 
neopositivistic etc. ways of thinking into Marxist philosophy, charges brought 
on by people who had no real knowledge about the subject. As he was a fellow 
at a department led by the most militant dialectical logician, he didn’t expect 
anything more in those years than that they leave him to work and teach.
In spite of the often astonishing circumstances, the seventies were fruitful 
years for Ruzsa both in terms of research and teaching. In modal logic, he gen-
eralized Prior’s idea of truth value gaps to semantic value gaps and on this basis, 
he elaborated a Kripke-style semantics for various systems of first-order mo-
dal logic. His first paper about these systems was his (1973b). His dissertation 
based on this research, entitled Individuals in modal logic, earned him the degree 
“Doctor of Philosophical Science” at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The 
expanded English version of the dissertation was published by Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (1981). Ruzsa was appointed full professor in 1978.
In terms of teaching logic, beyond the lectures for philosophy students, Ruzsa 
was given the task of teaching logic and mathematics for students in theoreti-
cal linguistics. There was a lucky coincidence between this task and his new 
interest in the logical modeling of natural languages. Ruzsa became acquainted 
with Montague semantics in mid-seventies and immediately began to investi-
gate how the idea of semantic value gaps might be implement into Montague 
grammar. This idea led to more substantial changes in Montague semantics than 
1  Let us emphasize among the different versions the legendary “three-volume one” 
(1973).
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in Kripke semantics but also proved to be even more fruitful.2 For these inves-
tigations and for his teaching activity, he received recognition within a circle of 
younger linguists and some of them joined him as personal students, partici-
pants and guest speakers at his seminars in the seventies and eighties.
In 1977, an opportunity arose to expand the group of “formal logicians” within 
the Department of Logic with two new lecturer appointments. Ruzsa planned 
to orchestrate the celebration of the 100th birthday of symbolic logic (the cen-
tenary of Frege’s Begriffschrift), and as a first task, he assigned to one of the new 
lecturers (namely, me) the translation of a selection from Frege’s writings. This 
volume was published with a slight delay, in 1980, accompanied by an issue 
of the Hungarian Philosophical Review which contained numerous papers on 
Frege and modern logic and translations of Frege’s articles “The Thought” and 
“Negation”. It was only Ruzsa’s own extensive programmatic article on Frege 
and the importance of modern logic for philosophy (1979) that was published 
exactly for the centenary in the Hungarian Philosophical Review. That is, the 
Review did not undertake to publish a special Frege-issue, as Ruzsa’s original 
intention had been. Nevertheless, the centenary of the Begriffsschrift was an im-
portant step towards the formation of Ruzsa’s school. The work of Frege offered 
a common starting point for the areas where Ruzsa’s writings and educational ac-
tivity gained influence over the previous years: logic, philosophy of mathemat-
ics, linguistics, philosophy of language. The works published for this occasion 
therefore reached all the actual and potential students of Ruzsa and sympathiz-
ers of his work.
Moreover, this time, Ruzsa could appear in public together with some of his 
students and members of his circle. In Hungarian philosophy, symbolic logic 
had often been associated with logical positivism (not only in the era of Marx-
ism-Leninism, but earlier, too). When Ruzsa, as a modern logician, was accused 
of smuggling neopositivistic influences into Marxist philosophy, he found this 
charge was awkward and at a the same time, also amusing. For he had no special 
sympathy for logical positivism at all. Carnap belonged, of course, to the most 
widely cited authors in his monographs, but mostly it was not out of Ruzsa’s 
agreement with Carnap’s claims. Ruzsa was much more inclined towards real-
ism; he was not a Frege-type Platonist, but his position was closer to Frege than 
to Carnap. This way,, the centenary celebration also offered an opportunity to 
present as the founding father of symbolic logic a thinker as far from neo-posi-
tivism or any sort of positivism as Frege was.
2  His first publication on this area was (1980).
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4 THE NEW DEPARTMENT
Through the eighties, the Ruzsa school flourished. There was a favourable 
turn of circumstances: in 1982, the unwanted marriage with dialectical logic 
could be broken off and a new “Group for symbolic logic and the methodol-
ogy of science” was founded, headed by Ruzsa. It was an odd, uncoventional 
unit that was subordinated to no departments but to the institute of philoso-
phy (“Marxism-Leninism”) only; yet it didn’t have the rank and rights of a de-
partment until 1984. The new department began to publish a yearbook called 
Tertium non datur. Besides the members of the department and Ruzsa’s PhD 
students, several linguists, philosophers and other scholars wrote articles and re-
views for the Tertium; its table of contents showed that Ruzsa and his circle were 
now gaining considerable influence in the humanities as well, among people 
interested in modern methodology.3 In the yearbook we could now break with 
the earlier strategy of keeping distance from debates; by this time, it contained 
several sharply critical papers. In the opening volume, Ruzsa and five of his 
younger colleagues published a paper that dissected a logic textbook that was 
in use at teacher-training colleges and unified obsolete ideas of traditional logic 
with dialectic materialistic slogans. At times, the analysis would change into sat-
ire. We had considerable fun putting together this critique, but didn’t foresee 
the consequences of it: during the next academic year, the textbook was with-
drawn by the ministry of education. But to tell the truth, we didn’t yet gather up 
the confidence to criticize dialectical logic.
Perhaps this is the time to say something about Imre himself as a man. It is 
not easy because his personality was rather hidden. Autonomy and steadfastness 
were among his major traits. He had chosen a path for himself and nobody could 
divert him from it. He wasn’t interested in success, praise or money; he did what 
he thought was the right thing to do and that was all there was to it. He was very 
helpful. I think most of the colleagues who knew him are indebted to him, but 
only few of us can claim to have had a truly personal conversation with him. He 
endured the humiliating situations that occured at the Department of Logic 
with calm irony and on rare occasions, with sarcastic remarks—it was only by the 
end of the nineties that I understood how deeply he was insulted by them, when 
we compiled a repertory volume from the volumes of Tertium non datur and 
he wanted to devote two pages of a four-page foreword to this topic. I needed 
hours to convince him that Comrade Erdei (the head of that department) didn’t 
deserve so much attention any more. Well, his good sense of humour and irony 
3  Let me illustrate this influence by quoting the names of the Hungarian authors of Tertium: 
András Bárd, Katalin Bimbó, István Bodnár M., Balázs Dajka, Katalin É. Kiss, Özséb Horányi, 
Márta Fehér, László Kálmán, Ferenc Kiefer, Gyula Klima, Imre Komlósi L., András Kornai, 
Judit Maár, Anna Madarász Zsigmond, Márta Maleczki, András Máté, Tamás Mihálydeák, 
Sándor Ónódy, Kornél Solt, Anna Szabolcsi, Zoltán Szabó [Gendler], Tibor Szécsényi.
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often helped him in difficult situations. He was a quiet person, never a loud 
word even if he was angered. On the other side, during the occasional relaxed 
moment, he liked to make jokes. In the eighties, he wrote a “Dictionary for 
patho-logicians”. Its entries contain “explanations” of logical notions that often 
mix wordplay with pin-pricks at colleagues and profound remarks. Unfortunate-
ly, most of them are basically untranslatable wordplays in Hungarian, but let me 
quote one that (hopefully) works in English as well:
Inconsistency: a heavy and contagious disease. Especially widespread among 
philologists. The reduction of texts is the only cure.
In the eighties, Ruzsa published two large monographs. The first was Clas-
sical, modal and intensional logic (1984). It contained less technical details but a 
thorough analysis of the philosophical literature on logic, especially on the logic 
of modalities. In this book, Ruzsa explored the philosophical motivations be-
hind his logic with semantic value gaps and gave in-depth arguments about its 
advantages. The second book is the two-volume Logical Syntax and Semantics—
volume I: (1988), volume II: (1989), in which the author gives a self-contained, 
comprehensive introduction to logical theory, together with the foundations of 
logical syntax and completing his survey with a description of a formalized frag-
ment of Hungarian. This is the main work of Ruzsa; I shall say more in a bit 
about its first, metalogical chapter.
5 THE LAST YEARS
Ruzsa retired from professorship and from chairing the department in 1990. 
This unavoidable step together with the fact that some members of the depart-
ment along with other colleagues from the Ruzsa-circle went on to pursue their 
careers abroad, at outstanding universities—which was otherwise very much a 
welcome fact—made the activities of the department somewhat more difficult 
and less effective. On the other side, at the end of the eighties began our coop-
eration with the Algebraic Logic department of the Alfréd Rényi Mathematical 
Institute of the Academy, which made it possible to start the Logic Graduate 
School, one of the very first graduate programs in Hungary. Although formally 
Ruzsa was not the leader of this graduate school, he did play a definitive role 
in its first years, up until the end of the 1990s. He published improved English 
versions of the two most important chapters of Logical syntax and semantics: In-
tensional logic revisited (1991) and Introduction to metalogic (1997). In 1991 he was 
awarded the Széchenyi Prize, the highest state honour for achievements in sci-
ence. In 1998 he was appointed professor emeritus. His last larger work was a 
new textbook of logic (1998), even more comprehensive than the three-volume 
one.
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Ruzsa’s advanced age and failing health gradually decreased his involvement 
in logic and the department. But his former students who visited him over the 
last years had the chance to witness his spirit remaining the same throughout.
6 PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
After this biographical outline, let me speak in some detail about Ruzsa’s 
work in two closely connected areas that received less attention in the confer-
ence program: philosophy of mathematics and metalogic. Through the sixties, 
his writings on the philosophy of mathematics emerged not so much from his 
research interests, but mostly as responses to the interests of his readers. As he 
writes in the foreword of Between Mathematics and Philosophy, he observed that 
many of his students couldn’t buy the lecture notes (1964) to his mathemat-
ics lectures for philosophy students (in which he discussed foundations and 
philosophy of mathematics in detail) because the copies were bought off by 
interested outsiders. He had written a book presupposing some mathematical 
knowledge, mainly for teachers of mathematics, but it was, again, not enough. 
So he published Between Mathematics and Philosophy (1968) for the larger public, 
setting forth in a popularizing style the mathematical background needed. But 
he didn’t regard this area his field of research; his goal was merely to summarize 
the basics of various trends in the philosophy of mathematics from his own per-
spective, and convey them to the Hungarian public. So we can’t speak about his 
philosophy of mathematics in the proper sense, I will therefore content myself 
with characterizing Ruzsa’s point of view.
Ruzsa focuses on introducing the three classical schools in the philosophy of 
mathematics: logicism, intuitionism and the Hilbert-school or formalism. His 
main stress is on the contents of and mathematical motivations behind these 
trends, their connection with research in the foundations of mathematics, but 
he also sets forth some critical remarks. His general opinion is that all the three 
schools capture something from the real nature of mathematics, but each of 
them is one-sided; that is, he argues for some sort of eclecticism. He has the 
most sympathy for Hilbert’s program which he demarcates from the formalist 
philosophy of mathematics. He agrees with this program in that foundational 
problems should be solved by mathematical tools, while staying away from de-
stroying what was constructed in mathematics. He argues that Gödel’s second 
incompleteness theorem has serious consequences for Hilbert’s program but he 
does not consider them fatal. But he does criticize formalists for rejecting the 
importance of content in mathematics. Theorems of mathematics have their 
content, they are true propositions and it happens only for the sake of metama-
thematical investigations that we abstract from their content and regard them 
just as syntactical strings. This moderate, realistic understanding of Hilbert’s 
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program and the sympathy for it is characteristic of the philosophical writings of 
Péter and Kalmár, too. But logicism is evaluated by Ruzsa in a more favorable 
way than by his predecessors, as he lays more stress on the philosophical, realist 
side of Frege’s and Russell’s logicism. On the other side, he criticizes intuition-
ists rather sharply.
Why were these writings of Ruzsa that contain little by way of original in-
sights so popular during the sixties? Today, readers may be astonished by the 
occasional Marxist detours and quotations from Engels or Lenin in these works. 
The official prescriptions of that era were such that it was allowed to expose 
non-Marxist philosophical views but only when the exposition was accompanied 
by a thorough Marxist criticism of them. Beyond the fact that Ruzsa surveyed 
an area that was virtually unknown in Hungary, the novelty of his writings was 
that he devoted far more space to the exposition and objective analysis of the 
various philosophies of mathematics than to their criticism. Actually, this was a 
similar approach as the one found in the works of the circle of George Lukács. 
For example, in the book Trends in contemporary bourgeois philosophy by György 
Márkus and Zádor Tordai from 1964, we find similar efforts: the authors present 
the different philosophical schools and thinkers from a Marxist perspective, but 
the primary stress is on the exposition and analysis of the views. There was a 
rather sizeable distance between this attitude and the practice of Soviet Marx-
ism, whose main concern was to classify non-Marxist thinkers as mechanical 
materialists, objective and subjective idealists and to discover traces of Marxist 
truth in their writings. It must be remarked that the Marxist detours were sin-
cere—both from the side of Ruzsa and from the Lukácsists. They all had some 
rather abstract commitment to Marxism and socialism—not the actual positions 
of party ideologists, of course. They tried to preserve as much from Marxism as 
they found acceptable—there was, of course, no place for criticizing Marxism 
where it was not acceptable.
7 METALOGIC AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC
After 1970, Ruzsa stopped publishing on the philosophy of mathematics. 
However, in his main work Logical Syntax and Semantics (1988, 1989) he made 
an important contribution to the circularity problem in foundations, that is, to 
the problem that logic has its semantical foundations in set theory but on the 
other hand, set theory is a theory which can prove its theorems within a logical 
framework. Ruzsa had always taught that a logical theory is useless if it has no 
intuitively acceptable semantical foundations. He criticized relevant logics of 
Zinoviev and systems of entailment for lacking such foundations and regarded 
Kripke semantics not only as a technical tool but as a way to make explicit the 
real content of modal logic. In his textbooks and lecture notes, the language 
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of logic is introduced in a purely semantical way. Inference rules are just men-
tioned but hardly anything further than that; on the elementary level, there are 
no formal deductions at all. Students should learn how to check the validity of a 
given inference by the methods of truth-tables, Venn-diagrams or semantic tab-
leauxs; they are not expected to find out consequences of a given set of premis-
es. The methods are semantical and their correctness is likewise confirmed by 
informal semantical considerations. (There is, of course, no formal semantics at 
this level.) This is in accord with Ruzsa’s rather strong realist commitment that 
is present in his writings about the philosophy of mathematics and in the para-
graphs and chapters concerning the philosophy of logic in his logical writings. 
The method to begin logic with semantically defined logical constants is present 
in Logical Syntax and Semantics, too; but quite surprising, that actually shows why 
Ruzsa was not a Platonist, in spite of all of his realist commitments.
The logical theory constructed there starts with introducing symbols of first-
order logic—logical constants and variables—into the language of communica-
tion (metalanguage). The single difference between their introduction and the 
usual way is that every variable is declared, that is, it is specified what values 
they are allowed to take. In this way, the extended metalanguage preserves the 
property presupposed about the language of communication, namely, that every 
proposition has one and only one truth-value. Only this much is needed by way 
of informal semantical considerations behind the metalanguage logic. In order 
to prove that the axioms of this theory are true, the metalanguage is extended 
with class abstractions that are constructed from monadic open sentences and it 
is enough to introduce some minimal class theory which needs no axioms but 
just definitions of the empty set, the subset relation and the usual binary opera-
tions.
The concepts and assumptions needed for the theory of canonical calculi con-
cern language as the class of expressions, that is, finite strings over a finite but 
nonempty alphabet (the class of letters). Using the operation of concatenation, 
the class of expressions can be described in an axiomatic way. Canonical calculi 
define inductive classes within the class of all expressions as strings deducible 
by a given finite set of rules. (Rules contain mostly a distinguished letter not 
contained in the alphabet: the arrow, and we are also allowed to use other auxil-
iary letters.) This very simple machinery suffices for the following:
–  to represent calculi by strings of the original alphabet;
–  to produce hypercalculi that define the class of all calculi;
–  to introduce Gödel numbering, using as “numbers” the strings formed so-
lely from an arbitrary element of the alphabet;
–  to prove that there are certain subclasses of the language that can be de-
fined in the metalanguage but are not inductive (although their comple-
ments with respect to the set of all expressions are).
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This last claim is in fact a Gödel-type theorem now. The following step is the 
introduction of Markov-algorithms that is natural and easy in this language be-
cause the formalisms of canonical calculi and Markov-algorithms are very similar. 
Roughly speaking, the single difference between the two is that in executing an 
algorithm, the next step is always determined; in executing a deduction within a 
canonical calculus, we are free to choose the next step among the allowed ones. 
Enumerability and decidability by algorithms are defined as usual, and it is easy 
to show that enumerable sets of expressions are the same as the inductively 
definable ones. A set is decidable iff both the set itself and its complement is 
enumerable. With respect to these facts, the theorem mentioned above has as a 
simple corollary a Church-type theorem: there are enumerable but undecidable 
sets of expressions.
Real first-order logic follows only after this theory of canonical calculi and al-
gorithms. We can inductively define the language of first-order logic and the set 
of provable formulas. Within this first-order logic, the theory of canonical calculi 
(CC) can be formalized and we can prove via metalanguage argumentation that 
all the theorems of CC are true. In fact, this is the only statement for which we 
need to use metalanguage logic and set theory. In other words, metalanguage 
logic has to be accepted on the basis of intuitive semantical background consid-
erations only as far as it is applied to classes of expressions, that is, strictly finite 
objects. The only place for infinity is that we need a weak form of the induction 
principle in our metalanguage argumentation. Metalanguage set theory is basi-
cally no more than an inventory of abbreviations; its theorems are in fact truths 
of metalanguage logic.
Everything else turns out surprisingly simple: it follows from the previous 
theorems that CC is not decidable and every theory which is an inductive class 
of theorems containing CC is negation-incomplete. Real set theory is a first-
order theory defined inductively, and we can use set theoretical propositions 
in constructing semantics for first-order logic only if we can prove them within 
this first-order set theory. This whole construction is the answer to the ques-
tion of how the priority of semantics should be understood: we should accept 
some semantical considerations before we can construct the syntax of our logic, 
but these considerations are reduced to a minimum that fulfils the Hilbertian 
requirement of finiteness. In the formal construction, the priority belongs to 
syntax and deducibility; there is no Platonic heaven of mathematical objects 
that we know about without knowing an axiomatic theory of them. Most of the 
details of Ruzsa’s construction of the foundations of logic are not his own inven-
tions; but the construction as a whole is both well-considered and well-founded 
on the philosophical side and elegant on the mathematical side.4
4  This paper was supported by the Hungarian Nationak Scientific Research Foundation 
OTKA, project No. 68043.
2010-4.indd   17 2011.01.21.   13:05:28
18 RUZSA’S WORK
REFERENCES
All the items in Hungarian if not indicated otherwise.
Ruzsa, Imre, 1964, Mathematics for philosophy students. Lecture notes, two volumes. Budapest, 
Tankönyvkiadó.
– , 1967, On some philosophical problems of mathematics + Mathematical logic (the latter with János 
Urbán). Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó.
–, 1968, Between mathematics and philosophy. Budapest, Gondolat. (German: Die Begriffswelt der 
Mathematik. 1976, Berlin, Volk und Wissen.)
–, 1969, Elementary logic. Lecture notes. Budapest, Tankönyvkiadó.
–, 1973, Symbolic logic. Lecture notes, three volumes (with co-authors). Budapest, Tankönyv-
kiadó.
–, 1973b, Prior-type modal logic (in English). Periodica Mathematica Hungarica. First part: 51-
69., second part: 183-201.
–, 1979, A hundred years of symbolic logic: the ouvre of Gottlob Frege. Magyar Filozófiai 
Szemle. 590-613.
–, 1980, Intensional logic without intensional variables. In I. Ruzsa (ed.), Modal and intensional 
logic. Budapest, OM Marxizmus-Leninizmus Oktatási Főosztálya.
–, 1981, Modal logic with descriptions (in English). The Hague, M. Nijhoff.
–, 1984, Classical, modal and intensional logic. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.
–, 1988, Logical syntax and semantics I. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.
–, 1989, Logical syntax and semantics II. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.
–, 1991, Intensional logic revisited (in English). Budapest, published by the author.
–, 1997, Introduction to metalogic (in English). Budapest, Áron Publishers.
–, 1998, Introduction to modern logic (with András Máté). Budapest, Osiris.
2010-4.indd   18 2011.01.21.   13:05:28
